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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is the law firm entitled to a fee in this case under the precedent in

Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy, 999 P.2d 572 (Utah 2000), and was there any basis
to deny the law firm that fee? The standard of review is "correction of error."
2.

Is the State's priority on the settlement proceeds a defacto lien

against Ms. Streight's property and, therefore, illegal under the federal anti-lien law, 42
U.S.C. §1396p? The standard of review for a trial court's legal conclusion is "correction
of error," or "correctness."1
In granting a motion for summary judgment, the court must be correct. It
has no discretion in the matter. Where the trial court has made a legal error in
determining the meaning or requirements of a statute, or refused to follow Supreme
Court precedent, the standard of review is correction of error. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v.
St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).
ORDER OF SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
Memorandum Decisions dated May 18, 2001, and June 11, 2002; and
Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of State of Utah entered by the Honorable
Kay L. Mclff on June 12, 2002.

1

Appellants are aware that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Houghton v. Department
of Health, Supreme Court No. 20001103, is dispositive on this issue. Nevertheless, since the
issue is under a recent Petition for Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, they
respectfully ask that the Court keep the issue open in the event that relief becomes available in
the interim.
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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
CONTROLLING REGULATORY & STATUTORY PROVISIONS
42 U.S.C.§1396p(a)(l) and (b)(1); 42U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A), (B) and
(I); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18).
CONTROLLING CASE LAW
Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067 (Utah 2002);
Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d466 (Utah 1998); S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d439 (Utah
1998); Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy, 999 P.2d 572 (Utah 2000).
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On June 9, 1998, Peggy Sue Streight was seriously injured in an
automobile-pedestrian accident in Gunnison, Utah. Being a single mother of three
children without health insurance, she was unable to pay for the extensive medical care
and extended hospital stay. As a result of her injuries, she was left with the mentality
of a 12 year-old girl. Her parents, Orval "Bud" and Karen Jensen ("the Jensens"), were
appointed as Ms. Streight's conservators and filed for assistance from the State Medicaid
program. During the application process, they repeatedly indicated on the official forms
that the injury resulted from a collision with a car, the name of the driver, and the name
of the driver's insurer. Eventually, the Jensens retained the law firm of Robert B. Sykes
and Associates ("the firm") to represent their daughter's interests in the personal injury
-2-

claim against the driver. In August of 1998, the firm procured a policy limits settlement
from various insurers of $110,000. R. 260-64. The proceeds of the settlement, less
attorney fees and costs were deposited in a special needs trust, with Ms. Streight named
as the beneficiary. R. 260-64.
This case was filed by the State on November 22, 1999. R. 1. The State
named Ms. Streight and the law firm as defendants. The State claimed a dollar-fordollar reimbursement of medical expenses paid on behalf of Ms. Streight for treatment
after her accident. The State also alleged that the law firm should be forced to disgorge
its fee and costs because, it claims, it did not inform the State of the claim.
At the trial court level, the State filed a motion for summary judgment,
claiming that whether the State could proceed against the recipient's special needs trust
and against the law firm were issues of law. R. 185-305. In a memorandum decision,
the trial court agreed. It not only allowed the State to recover virtually the entirety of
the special needs trust, but snubbed the precedent set in ORS v. McCoy and forced the
firm to remit its entire fee as well. The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied. R. 635-722. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Collision and Injury. Ms. Peggy Sue Streight, age 39, was severely

and permanently injured in an automobile-pedestrian accident in Gunnison, Utah, on
June 9, 1998. Peggy Sue was walldng to a movie theater at night, in the rain, wearing
dark clothes and jay-walking, when she was struck by an automobile. As a result of the
-3-

accident, she was in a coma for 2Vi weeks, has been left with the mentality of a 12-yearold, and is under the protection of conservators. R. 3-4. A conservatorship for Peggy
Sue Streight is in place. R. 260-64.
2.

Indigent Circumstances. Ms. Streight was divorced and did not

have the financial resources necessary to provide for the medical care for her injuries
resulting from the accident. R. 335.
3.

State Notified of Tort Claim. On June 17, 1998, Orval I. (Bud)

Jensen, Ms. Streight's father, applied for Medicaid assistance on Ms. Streight's behalf.
On June 26,1998, Mr. Jensen completed and submitted a form questionnaire identifying
the driver of the car as "Sharon Christiansen" (aka Sherilyn Christenson)2 and correctly
noting Ms. Christenson's automobile insurance carrier as Utah "Farm Bureau Ins."
R. 565-68.
4.

Attorneys Retained. On August 18, 1998, Mr. Jensen retained

Robert B. Sykes & Associates ("the lawyers" or "firm") to pursue a recovery for Ms.
Streight from Utah Farm Bureau and Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. (the underinsured
carrier). This Firm was the fourth group of lawyers consulted by the Jensens to represent
Peggy Sue, with the other three having turned them down. R. 331-32. This was nearly
52 days after Jensen had provided the Medicaid office with notice of the possibility of
a third-party action.

2

The name has various forms of spelling in different documents.
-4-

5.

Settlement Proceeds Deposited into Trust. On September 17,

1998, Defendants petitioned the Sixth District Court to appoint a conservator, establish
a "special needs trust," and approve a settlement with the insurers. An order was signed
on September 23, 1998, approximately three months after the Jensens had given notice
in the Medicaid application of the name of the defendant and the insurance company.
The settlement arrangement called for Farm Bureau to pay $ 100,000, and Ohio Casualty
to pay $10,000. The Court approved payment of a contingency fee for Sykes &
Associates in the amount of $38,030.92. R. 11-14.
6*

Decisions in Wallace and 5.5. Handed Down. On November 27,

1998, two months after the settlement was approved, the Utah Supreme Court handed
down its rulings in Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998), and S.S. v.
State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998), wherein it upheld provisions of the Utah Medical
Benefits Recovery Act as not illegal under Federal law. These rulings expressly allowed
the State to proceed directly against third-party tortfeasors who injured Medicaid
recipients (third party liability or "TPL" claims). The State's lien claim was deemed to
be against the third party, not the recipient, and therefore not illegal under Federal law.
These decisions were reaffirmed recently in Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101,
57P.3d 1067 (Utah 2002).
7.

State Sues for $ 107,000. The State filed the instant action seeking

reimbursement for $107,000 on November 22, 1999. R. 1-9.

-5-

8.

Summary Tudgment Granted. On October 6,2000, the State filed

a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court granted summary judgment to the
State in a Memorandum Decision dated May 18, 2001. R. 392-417. Judgment was
entered against Streight for $69,332.78 and against her attorneys for $38,030.92.
R. 846.
9.

McCoy Rejected by the Trial Court. The trial court refused to

apply the recent Utah Supreme Court decision in State Office ofRecovery Services v. McCoy,
999 P.2d 572 (Utah 2000), and urged the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision.
R. 400.
10.

Collection Would Impoverish Ms. Streight. The judgment

consumes almost the entirety of the settlement ($107,000 of $110,000). R. 846. The
only assets Peggy Sue has after the accident are her house, which the trust purchased
with the settlement funds, and seven acres of land, also purchased by the trust.
R. 331-33. This would all go to the State to satisfy the judgment.
Summary of Arguments
The plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7 and this Court's
recent decision in McCoy require the State to pay its share of attorney fees where it
obtains reimbursement of Medicaid funds through the efforts of a private attorney. In
this case, the State was notified of the claim and then sought reimbursement directly
from the recipient after she had gained a recovery through her private attorneys. Under
McCoy, the State is required to pay its proportionate fee for the reimbursement it
-6-

obtained. The State should not be allowed to reap where others have sown without
paying its share.
Since the Jensens notified the State of the claim and the State was not
prejudiced by the action taken by appellants, it should not be allowed to recover without
paying its share of attorney fees. The Jensens gave repeated notice that Ms. Streight's
injuries resulted from the negligence of another. Furthermore, since the State was able
to make a recovery directly against the recipient through her special needs trust, it was
not prejudiced by the appellants as it has maintained below.
The appellants recognize the precedent set by this Court in S.S., Wallace,
and Houghton, wherein it has held that the State may proceed against the recipient
directly to recover reimbursement for medical expenses paid under through its Medicaid
program. By renewing the issue again in Point III, appellants only seek to preserve the
issue in this case pending anticipated review by the Supreme Court of the United States.

-7-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7 AND
THE RULE IN McCOY REQUIRE THE STATE TO PAY A
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEE FOR THE SETTLEMENT
PROCURED BY THE LAW FIRM.
Both Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7 and this Court's decision in McCoy
require the State to pay its share of attorney fees when it obtains funds from a thirdparty tortfeasor through the efforts of a private attorney. Section 26-19-7(4) reads as
follows:
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action
that is commenced with the department's written consent.
Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7 (2002). This section was interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 572 (Utah 2000).
In that case, the State sought recovery for Medicaid expenses paid directly from the
recipient after the recipient had hired private counsel to obtain the settlement from the
third party. In that case, as in the case at hand, the State refused to pay any attorney
fees. The Utah Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Russon, interpreted the
statute to require the State to pay its share of attorney fees up to 33% of the State's
recovery. Id. at 1118, 576-77'. No matter the avenue of recovery the State elects to
pursue, the rule in McCoy requires it to pay its share of attorney fees on a settlement
procured by counsel:

-8-

In sum, while the Act provides discretion to the State when selecting a
suitable avenue for recovering medical assistance, each method of recovery
requires the State to pay its share of attorney fees. The State may (1) take
action directly against the third party, for which the State pays its own
expenses; (2) grant consent to recipients seeking to pursue the State's
claim, whereby the State's recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney
fees and, if any, its proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3)
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient after the recipient recovers
from the third party, in which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by
reasonable attorney fees.
Id. at 1f 19, 577. The rule clearly requires the State to pay attorney fees when it obtains
reimbursement through a settlement procured by the efforts of a private attorney.
As the facts in McCoy and in the Record bear out, before that ruling, the
State would frequently refuse consent to petitioning lawyers, wait for the lawyers to
bring in a settlement, and then make a full recovery from the recipient without paying
its share of fees. See Id. at 1HI3-7, 574; see also Affidavit of James D. Vilos, R. 485-500.
After McCoy, a recipient may not, without the State's consent, commence or settle a TPL
action for the State's share, but may file his/her own action, and still get an attorney fee
from the State, even without State consent. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(1)(a) and
(4) (1998). See McCoy, 999 P.2d at 576-77 ("[I]t would be inherently unfair not to
award attorney fees to McCoy . . . ." Id. at 577). Therefore, "when the State elects to
recover directly from a recipient who has expressly excluded the State's claim from any
attempt to recover from a third party, the State must pay the attorney fees incurred in
procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds." Id.

-9-

In the case sub judice, the law firm procured a settlement of $110,000 for
their client, Peggy Sue Streight. For its services, the firm took a contingency fee of 33%
plus costs for a total of approximately $38,000. Just as in McCoy, the State immediately
moved to make a dollar-for-dollar recovery of its approximately $107,000 in Medicaid
expenses and steadfastly refused to pay any attorney fees to the law firm. R. 1-9.
The State has systematically and intentionally denied permission to lawyers
representing indigent clients who have received Medicaid. McCoy was not an isolated
case. See Joint Affidavit of Robert B. Sykes and Matthew Raty, R. 527-29, 541-42; see
also R. 511-18. The disturbing implication is that the State has, in the past, denied
permission for representation, implying it will pursue the claim on its own. However,
it did nothing because it was not equipped to handle these cases, it allowed the private
attorney to pursue expensive discovery, awaited recovery, and then stepped in,
demanding to be paid in full.
Before McCoy, the precedent in Camp v. ORS, 779 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. of
App. 1989), was misread to imply that the State must only pay fees and costs on its
share if it gives permission. See Memorandum Decision, R. 616-22. Of course, this
provides incentive to deny permission in many cases and wait for the private attorneys
to act to gain a recovery. Defendants submit that this scenario has played out many
times. It happened in McCoy, it happened in Wallace, and it happened in Peggy Sue
Streight's case.

- 10-

The State has neither the expertise, resources or will to go after these TPL
recoveries from start to finish. See R. 466-83. It is therefore inequitable to allow the
State to profit from the uncompensated sweat and toil of others. The State should be
made to pay for what it has reaped, where it has not sown.
POINT II
THE STATE MUST PAY ATTORNEY FEES WHERE STREIGHT
COOPERATED AND WHERE THE STATE HAS NOT BEEN
PREJUDICED BY STREIGHT MOVING FORWARD ON HER
CLAIM.
A. Streight Cooperated and Identified the Third Party.
The State may try to imply that Streight and counsel did not "cooperate"
with it in identifying the potentially liable third party. Following the precedent in
McCoy and the undisputed facts in this case, this Court should rule that Streight
cooperated in identifying the third-party tortfeasor as contemplated in that opinion.
Exhibit 1, Medicaid Application Forms, see also R. 565-68.
In McCoy, the State also charged that the Medicaid recipient did not
"cooperate" under very similar facts. In both cases, no action was instituted but a
compromise or settlement was agreed upon where the third party was released. McCoy
did not obtain the consent of the State because the State would not give it. McCoy, 999
P.2d at 576, 1117. In the instant case, consent was not sought, but McCoy shows that
consent is immaterial as long as the recipient cooperates with the State in providing the
identifying information so that the State may pursue its own third-party claim, which
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cooperation the Streights uncontestedly provided. See Exhibit 1. The Supreme Court
observed:
The State suggested at oral argument that McCoy should not be entitled
to attorney's fees because hefailed to inform the state that Great American
was the insured with whom he was settling Sevey's claim. We emphasize
that a recipient has a duty to cooperate with the State in identifying and
providing information to assist the State in pursuing any third party who
may be liable to pay for medical care and services, [citations omitted]
Keeping the State informed insures that the State will not be prejudiced
in its efforts to recover medical benefits. . . . In the instant case, McCoy
failed to keep the State minimally informed, but McCoy's lack of
forthrightness did not prejudice the State's claim against the third party.
McCoy, 999 P.2d at 577,1118, fn. 4. Likewise in the instant case, Streight cooperated
with the State by timely providing the identity of the negligent third party, as well as her
insurance company. This information was provided twice in the Medicaid application
forms, first in June 26, 1998, almost three months before the settlement. Exhibit 1,
Medicaid Application Forms, see also R. 565-68. This fact is not contested. Further, the
State is not prejudiced because if it prevails on the priority issue, the State will recover
whatever amount it is legally owed by Streight.
B. No Prejudice to the State.
The State cannot claim that it was "prejudiced" against the third party due
to Streight (or her attorney's) actions. Streight gave notice to the State on June 26,
1998, by providing the liable third party's name and insurance company. See Exhibit 1,

- 12-

which is part of the Record.3 R. 565-68. The State did nothing with this information
until after the settlement was consummated.
A Medicaid recipient is not restrained at law from pursuing his or her own
claim. There are several statutory provisions which recognize the recipient's right to do
so. For example, § 26-19-5(5) gives the department a right to commence its own
independent action against a third party, but "does not bar an action by a recipient. . .
for loss or damage not included in the department's action" (Emphasis added.) In other
words, the recipient has his/her own claim and may file it, without restriction, as long
as it does not include a claim for the assistance paid by the department. Section 26-197 (1) (a) reaffirms the existence of two claims when it says that the recipient may not file
or settle a claim against the third party "for recovery of medical costs for an injury . . .
for which the department has provided . . . medical assistance." (Emphasis added.) In
other words, the injured person is free to claim for the non-medical assistance damages.
Furthermore, even though the department has a right to bring an independent action
against the third party under § 26-19-6, the recipient has an absolute right to "intervene
in the department's action at any time before trial." Id. Clearly, Streight may pursue
her own action for non-Medicaid damages (e.g. pain and suffering, lost wages, etc.), and
does not have to wait for the State to take action. When Streight settled, the State did
3

The State does not dispute receiving this information since it is on the Medicaid
application itself. Further, on Summary Judgment, this Court construes all proven or well-pled
facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing Summary Judgment. Therefore, it must be
assumed that the State knew the identity of the TPL defendant and her insurance company
about three months before the settlement was consummated.
- 13-

lose its cause of action against the third-party tortfeasor, but that is due to the State's
own lack of action. However, this did not prejudice the State, because its lien is still
valid and will be paid, but only because counsel procured the settlement. In other
words, even if the State could not go after the third party directly, under the precedent
set in S.S. and Wallace, it could make a recovery directly against Streight.
Even though the State failed to take any action against the third party
before the settlement, it later learned of the settlement and gave the conservators notice
of the claim. Assuming this Court does not otherwise hold the lien claim to be an illegal
priority, the State will be paid, and therefore has not been prejudiced. According to
McCoy, the State can "proceed against the recipient after the recipient recovers from the
third party, in which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by reasonable attorneys
fees." Id. at 577,1119. That is exactly where we are in this case. The State did not give
consent, proceeded against the recipient, not against the third party, even though it had
notice, and will receive a recovery based upon counsel's efforts. The State is arguably
entitled to that recovery which "shall be reduced by reasonable attorney's fees." Id.
POINT III
IT IS MANIFEST ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
BLATANTLY REFUSE TO APPLY EXISTING SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT. BASED ON UTAH R. APP. P. 10(a)(3), THE
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED WITH
REGARD TO ATTORNEY FEES.
The trial court committed manifest error by refusing to follow recent and
directly-on-point precedent in McCoy. Manifest error exists when the error is plain and
- 14-

made to appear "on the face of the record

" State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 102, 60 P.2d

952, 958 (1936). See also, State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("The first
requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error be plain, i.e., from our
examination of the record, we must be able to say that it should have been obvious to
a trial court that it was committing error.").
The trial court plainly and openly refused to apply binding Supreme Court
precedent. Office ojRecovery Services v. McCoy, 999 P.2d 572 (Utah 2000) was decided
by this Court in 2000.

This Court there held that "when the State elects to recover

directly from a recipient . . . , the State must pay the attorney's fees incurred in
procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds." See McCoy, 999 P.2d at 577.
The State's "consent" was not required. Id. The trial court unabashedly rejected and
criticized this precedent stating:
There is simply no statutory authorization for awarding attorney's fees
against the State unless it has given its written consent. The result in
McCoy allowing attorney's fees in the absence of consent or statutory
authorization is an aberration and should be limited to its facts. It is the
peculiar and compelling facts of that case which warrant the equitable
result reached rather than the supreme court's abbreviated andflawed legal
analysis of the statute.
Memorandum Decision, May 18, 2001, p. 13 (emphasis added). The trial court claims
the majority in McCoy u engages in a tortured reading of the statute" to reach its holding.
Memorandum Decision, p. 14. The trial court then rendered a 4-point detailed critique
of McCoy, claiming that "consent" really should be required.
Decision, pp. 15-17. The trial court finally opined that:
- 15-

See Memorandum

It is my considered view that the supreme court must abandon or refine its
decision in McCoy regarding attorney's fees and must examine UCA §2619-7 in its entirety. It must construe and give meaning to subsection (4)
not as an island but as it relates to subsection (3) and the other provisions
which expressly require the State's written consent.
Memorandum Decision, p. 17 (emphasis added). As this language clearly illustrates, the
trial court directly rejected and refused to apply the precedent set by the Utah Supreme
Court in McCoy because it believed that consent to sue should be required. In doing so,
the trial court committed a manifest error, which should be corrected by this Court's
reversal of the order.
POINT IV
AFTER THE RECENT DECISION IN HOUGHTON, APPELLANTS
ONLY RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE LEGALITY OF THE LIEN TO
PRESERVE IT, PENDING REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT.
Due to this Court's recent ruling in Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002
UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067 (Utah 2002), appellants acknowledge that in Utah the law
currently does allow the State to pursue a priority lien directly against the recipient. In
asserting this issue, appellants now only seek to preserve it as long as possible since
Petitions for Certiorari are now pending review in Houghton and in Martin v. City of
Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002), petition for certiorari pending U.S. Supreme Court
No. 02-117, which would resolve this issue.
For argument on the issue, we incorporate by reference the argument before
the trial court to the effect that the State's lien and priority constitute an illegal lien on
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a recipient, contrary to Federal law, and are preempted. R. 519-24 and 641-56. See also
dissent in Houghton, 57 P.3d at 1073-74.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7 and this Court's recent decision in McCoy
require the State to pay its share of attorney fees where it obtains reimbursement
through the efforts of a private attorney. In this case, the State was notified of the claim
and then took action directly against the recipient after she had gained a recovery
through her private attorneys. Under McCoy, the State was then required to pay its
proportionate fee for the reimbursement it obtained. The State should not be allowed
to reap where others have sown.
The appellants recognize the precedent set by this Court in S.S., Wallace,
and Houghton, wherein it has held that the State may proceed against the recipient
directly to recover reimbursement for medical expenses paid under through its Medicaid
program. Appellants only seek to preserve the issue pending resolution of the petition
for certiorari.
DATED this 1st day of April, 2003.
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